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The Appellant: 
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RULES 
U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2) provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported 
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant 
portions of the transcript. 
C.J.A. 4-505: 
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set 
forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by 
the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and 
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Appellant Christenson lacks standing to challenge the judgment of 
the Trial Court where Appellant: 1) did not oppose the entry of summary judgment; 2) is not a 
party affected by the challenged portion of the judgment; 3) has no interest in the subject matter 
to which a challenge is made; and 4) there is no public policy reason to permit the Appellant to 
act on behalf of those potentially affected by the judgment. 
Standard of Review. A court, including an appellate court, may address the issue of 
standing at any time in proceedings by motion or sua sponte. Sierra Club v. Dept. ofEnv. 
Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Whether the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the Trial Court's amounted to 
an abuse of discretion based the evidence before it. 
Standard of Review. If there is a sufficient evidentiary basis, the amount and 
reasonablness of the fee awarded is left to the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed absent abuse of that discretion. Foote v. Clark 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998). 
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RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
CJ.A. Rule 4-505 provides in relevant part: 
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court 
and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work 
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to 
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which 
attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case arises out of a foreclosure proceeding commenced by Plaintiff/Appellant 
Richard Christenson ("Christenson") against numerous potential interest holders of certain real 
property in Salt Lake County, including the Defendants/Appellees, the Michels ("Michels"). 
After nearly four years of prosecuting the litigation, Christenson conceded that he held no 
interest in the property and that Michels were entitled to summary judgment against Christenson. 
See R. 1216. Judgment was entered accordingly. Id. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
On March 29, 1996, Christenson began foreclosure proceedings against certain real 
property in Salt Lake County, (the "Property"). Christenson's foreclosure action sought to 
foreclose a 1978 lien Christenson claimed against the Property. 
The Michels asserted a superior ownership interest in the Property, as successors in 
interest to Zions Bank, owners of the Property through a Trustee's Deed acquired in 1993. See R. 
179-183. Christensen sued the Michels and dozens of other defendants with a potential record 
interest in the Property. 
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Throughout the four year course of the litigation, pleadings were amended, over a dozen 
depositions were conducted, numerous expert witnesses were retained, discovery was exchanged. 
There are over 1200 pages of documents in the Trial Court record alone. The Court of Appeals 
decision in the related case ofZions First National Bank v. Richard McKean, et, al, 200 UT App 
76, held that Christenson's 1978 lien interest had been terminated by foreclosure proceeding in 
1983 by Zion's Bank. See R. 1139-1144. Based on the ruling that Christenson's interest was 
foreclosed in 1983, Christenson conceded that Michels were entitled to summary judgment in 
this matter. See R. 1216. Christenson now appeals the form of the order which holds that the 
Michels are the owners of the Property as against all others and for the amount of attorneys fees 
awarded to the Michels by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Christenson does not appeal the factual basis for the court's decision granting 
Appellees Michels Summary Judgment or Michels' entitlement to attorneys fees. On appeal, 
Christenson only disputes the breadth of the final order and the evidentiary basis of the amount 
of attorney's fees awarded. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In this matter, Christenson has no standing to attack the portion of the judgment which 
adjudicates the potential interests of unrelated third parties whom Christenson had originally 
named as defendants in the case. Further, Christenson fails to marshal the evidence present in 
the trial court to demonstrate that not all of the named defendants were served and so should not 
be bound by the Trial Court's ruling. 
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The Michels were awarded their attorneys fees by Judge Young. Christenson does not 
challenge Michel's entitlement to attorneys fees. Instead, on appeal Christenson challenges the 
evidentiary support for the amount of the award and its reasonableness. Again, Christenson fails 
to marshal the evidence supporting the award and demonstrate why the evidence presented was 
insufficient to support the award. The facts show that evidence of the amount of fees and their 
reasonableness were considered by Judge Young whose judgment should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDING 
A. APPELLANT CHRISTENSON LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. 
On appeal, Christenson argues that the Trial Court's Order is overly-broad because it 
potentially binds parties over whom the Trial Court had no jurisdiction. Although it is axiomatic 
that judgments are presumed valid, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
When a Judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered 
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that 
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking 
jurisdiction to prove its absence. 
State Dept. of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The 
judgment in this matter provides in relevant part: 
Defendants Michelsy Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly, 
neither the Plaintiff nor any of the Defendants in this action other than the four 
Michel Defendants, have any right, title or interest in and to the real property 
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which is the subject of this action. Such real property is further described on the 
attached Exhibit "A". 
R. 1216. 
First, it should be remembered that Appellant Christenson conceded that he had no 
interest in the Property based on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the companion case which 
terminated his interest as a matter of law. See R. 179-183. The Trial Court's Order echoes that 
admission. R. 1216. 
Now, for some reason, Appellant Christenson now chooses argue on behalf of the other 
defendants that the Order is too broad because it may bar the interests of some defendants or 
unknown third parties. It seems rather ironic that Christenson now seeks to protect the potential 
interests of the very people whom he sought to deprive of any interest in the Property by the 
foreclosure proceedings he started. Christenson has absolutely no legal interest in the property. 
Christenson has conceded that fact stipulated to the entry of summary judgment. R. 1216. 
In order to have standing in Utah a person must show three things: 
First, a litigant must show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. 
Second, the litigant may have standing if no one else has a greater interest 
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised 
otherwise. Even if he is unable to meet the first two tests, under the third 
test, a litigant may nonetheless have standing if the issues are unique and 
of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in the 
furtherance of the public interest. 
Blodgett v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Terracor v. Utah 
Bd. Of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1983)). 
Appellant Christenson fails to satisfy any of the requirements necessary to gain standing 
to challenge the Order of the Trial Court. Appellant has no stake in the outcome of the judgment 
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as it relates to any third parties. Appellant further conceded that he had no interest in the 
Property in the Trial Court. See R. 1916. The interests of those claiming to have an interest in the 
Property have, if they desire, the right to challenge the judgment themselves. See e.g. Vigil, at 
1133. If the judgment was rendered against their interests without jurisdiction, the Trial Court 
may then act to address the issue. However, it is not for Appellant to assert those claims on 
behalf of others. Finally, there is no public interest aspect to this private, civil dispute. In sum, 
Appellant Christenson fails to show standing under any of the three available methods set forth 
under Utah law and the case should be affirmed for Christenson's lack of standing to challenge 
the entry of Summary Judgment as such judgment relates to others. 
B. APPELLANT CHRISTENSON FAILS TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT HIS CLAIMS. 
Appellant Christenson fails to marshal any evidence from the record to support his claims 
that not all interested parties were served in this matter. Aside from the fact that Appellant has 
no standing to challenge the judgment on behalf of others, he fails to marshal the evidence in the 
record to support his claims. It is Appellant's burden on appeal to place all of the evidence 
regarding service of the defendants before this Court and then to demonstrate its inadequacy. It 
is not for the Appellee to demonstrate, by citing to the record or otherwise, that all defendants 
were served personally or by publication. The burden to show it didn't happen rests with the 
Plaintiff/Appellant. Appellant Christensen utter failure to address the record on appeal or marshal 
the evidence regarding which parties were or were not served is fatal to his claims on appeal. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, a detailed review of the record discloses that the 
Appellant in incorrect in his assertion that the other defendants were not properly served. Many 
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of the defendants were served individually. The remainder were served by publication following 
appellants motion and subsequent Court order permitting such service. 
II. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPER AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Christenson does not argue on appeal that the Michels are not entitled to an award of 
attorneys fees. Appellant challenges the adequacy of the evidence supporting amount of the fees 
awarded. Rule 4-505 states: 
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and 
set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by 
the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time 
spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm 
the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
C.J.A. 4-505. 
Typically where there is an appeal of an award of attorneys fees, the court examines the 
award for correctness. Foote v. Clark,962, P. 2d 53 (Utah 1998). However, the Appellees' right 
to recover attorneys fees in this matter is not disputed by Appellant Christenson and should not 
be subject to this Court's appellate review. Instead, Appellant appeals only on the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the amount of the award. In such a case, when the court can determine 
the evidentiary basis for the award is adequate, the award will be upheld. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald 
961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). 
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In his effort to persuade this Court that counsel's affidavit was insufficient, Appellant's 
counsel resorts to flat misrepresentation of the contents of counsel's affidavit. Appellant 
represents to this Court that Michels' counsel's "affidavit makes it apparent that the charges 
include sums for attorney's fees for work done on cases other than the case before Judge Young." 
See Brief of Appellant, P.8. This assertion is plainly contrary to the averment of Michels' 
counsel contained on paragraph 8 of his affidavit. Counsel stated: 
The foregoing fees are related to this case only. Additional fees have been expended in 
the related cases of (a) Zions First National Bank v. Richard McKean, et, al (handled by 
Judge Frederick) and TWN v. Michel, (pending in Provo). None of time for such cases 
has been included in this Affidavit. 
R. 1196-1197. 
This exact same argument was raised and rejected by the Trial Court. See, R. 1190. 
That the Trial Court chose to believe counsel's representation over Christenson's baseless 
assertion is obvious. 
Christenson next argues that the amount of the fees must be excessive because they 
exceeded the fees Christenson expended in the same proceeding. In Foote, the court held that the 
amount of the damages recovered does not make the attorneys fees unreasonable "just because it 
is greater than the amount recovered under the contract." Foote, at 56. Similarly, the amount of 
fees that one party expends defending a matter is not unreasonable just because the opposing 
party spends less on the matter. The affidavit was sufficient under C.J.A. Rule 4-505 because it 
identified the attorneys who worked on the file, detailed the types of activities in which the 
parties were engaged for over four years, such as responding to the Complaint and the Amended 
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Complaint, conducting depositions, discovery, research, motions, hearings, etc. See R. 1195-
1201. The record before the Trial Court comprises 1200 pages of documents and pleadings 
which does not include any of the deposition transcripts or the voluminous discovery exchanged. 
Christenson's counsel also attacks the hourly rate of $160.00. The rate is supported by 
the affidavit of counsel and his 23 years of experience as a litigator in Salt Lake County. The 
hourly rate was not challenged with any evidence to the contrary in the court below. The bare 
conclusions forward by Christenson that the hourly rate is excessive fail to demonstrate that the 
hourly rate was unreasonable. 
B. APPELLANT CHRISTENSON FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
THE FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Appellant Christenson asserts that the findings were inadequate to support the attorney's 
fees awarded by the Trial Court. Appellant has chosen not to provide a transcript of the Trial 
Court's hearing on the matter. Appellant cannot fail to order the transcript of the proceedings in 
which the findings were made and then claim the record is insufficient to support the award. 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is 
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript. 
U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2). 
In the Court's June 2,2000 Minute Entry the Judge stated, "The Court grants the motion for 
summary judgment and awards attorneys fees. Mr. Nelson is to prepare an affidavit and order for 
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the Court." R. 1189. The tape number and tape count of the hearing was set forth in the Trial 
Court's Minute Entry. See R. 1189. In it's last Minute Entry, the Court stated: 
On June 2, 2000, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
awarded attorney's fees. Mr. Nelson prepared an affidavit and Order for the Court 
consistent with the Court's findings. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file approves and signs the Defendants 
Order for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Order Granting Attorney's Fees 
R. 1207 (emphases added). 
Appellant bears the initial burden of marshaling all the evidence to show that despite the 
evidence presented to the Trial Court, the findings were insufficient to base the award of 
attorney's fees. In some cases the burden of marshaling the evidence is excused where the record 
is incomplete. See Anderson v. Doms, UT App. 207, |^ 9-10. However, the Appellant cannot be 
the cause of the incomplete record. In this matter, Appellant Christenson invites the very error 
he attempts assign on appeal. Christenson failed to order a transcript of the findings referenced 
in the June 2, 2000 Minute Entry. See R. 1224. Appellant's own failure to request a transcript 
cannot provide him the platform upon which to stand to argue the Court's findings are 
incomplete. Appellant's failure to marshal the evidence in the record which was available 
violates the purposes of U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2). As a result, Christenson fails to carry his burden on 
appeal to demonstrate that the award of fees was based on inadequate findings, insufficient 
evidentiary foundation or amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
The Court can uphold a fee determination when the underlying evidence is sufficient to 
support such an award without an entry of findings by the Court. See Valcarce, at 319. In this 
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matter there was only one party with a claim against the Appellees Michels. The Michels 
defended the matter for four years and expended considerable sums in doing so. The detailed 
nature of the charges was expressed in the affidavit of counsel, there was no counter-affidavit or 
any evidence submitted to suggest that time billed to Appellees Michels was expended in other 
pursuits or on unrelated claims, parties or issues. This contrasts the fee separation requirements 
imposed on parties in multi-party or multiple claim litigation as required by Foote. Appellant's 
failure to properly place the record before the Court and marshal the evidence are fatal to his 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Christenson's appeal must fail because he has no standing to contest how the Trial 
Court's Order may affect third parties. Christenson also fails to demonstrate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in the amount of attorneys fees awarded where the evidentiary basis for the 
award was adequate on the record and when he failed to marhsal the evidence necessary to 
challenge the award on appeal. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_ day of March, 2001 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
By: [ y^*~- J-1 JUISTU^/ 
ice J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees, 
Michels 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this . day of March, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, the required number of true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief to the 
following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON SNUFFER & DAHLE, P.C. 
Attorney for Richard A. Christenson 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
d.i J(b$K-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
MAR 1 6 2000 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Zions First National Bank, a 
national association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard A. Christensen; 
Richard F. McKeen and Maurine 
G. McKeen, his wife; New 
Empire Development Company; 
Backman Abstract and Title; 
Capitol Thrift and Loan; 
Franklin Financial; Traverse 
Kills Associates; Valley Bank 
& Trust Company; Myron B. 
Child, Jr. dba Child & 
Associates; State Tax 
Commission; and Martha W. 
Snyder, 
Defendants and Appellant, 
Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, 
Ullrich Michel, and Corolla 
Michel, 
Intervenors. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981733-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 6 , 2000) 
2000 UT App 761 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Sandy, for Appellant 
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Davis. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Defendant Richard A. Christensen appeals the trial court]s 
denial of his Renewed Motion to Vacate Judgment. Defendant first 
argues nhat the 1982 judgment rust oe vacated for lack of in 
personam jurisdiction 
"'A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment 
under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only 
for an abuse of discretion However, wnen a 
motion to vacate a judgment is based on a 
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district 
court has no discretion if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment: cannot stand without 
denying due process to the one against whom 
it runs Therefore, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional determination, and hence the 
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of 
law upon which we oo not defer to the 
district court '" 
Classic Cabinets, Inc v All m^ life Ins Co , 1999 UT App 88, 
*|9, 978 P 2d 465 (citations omitted) 
Defendant has the burden to snow tnat the trial court lacked 
the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant's rights 
"'When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered 
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that 
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking 
jurisdiction to prove its absence '" Bonneville Billing v 
Whatley, 949 P 2d 768, 775 n 7 (Utah Ct App 1997) (alteration 
and citation omitted), accord State v Viiil, 784 P 2d 1130, 1133 
(Utah 1989), see also Skanchv v Calcacos Ortope SA, 952 P 2d 
1071, 1074-75 (Utah 1998) ("[Defendant] had the burden of showing 
that the service was invalid " ) , Reed v Reed. 806 P 2d 1182, 
1185 (Utah 1991) (" [T]he burden was upon defendant to prove that 
service was improper ") "This presumption is based at least 
partially on necessity " Villi, 784 P 2d at 1133 
The presumption is that judgments of superior 
courts of general jurisdiction are regularly 
rendered even though the record does not 
disclose that the court acquired jurisdiction 
and the fact that there was no allegation or 
finding as to a jurisdictional requirement is 
not grounds for setting aside the judgment 
after the expiration of the time for appeal 
The distinction to be made is between a 
record on the face of which lack of 
jurisdiction is apparent and one which is 
silent or incomplete as to some 
jurisdictional fact In the latter instance 
the mere absence from the record of necessary 
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jurisdictional facts will not overcome the 
presumption of jurisdiction. 
Coshatt v. Calmac Mfa. Corp., 602 P.2d 845, 846 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1979) (emphasis added). 
" [T]he invalidity or absence of service of process can be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence." Carnes v. Carnes, 668 
P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983); see also Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App 
88 at Kl3. The only "evidence" defendant has provided is the 
lack of a return of service in the original trial court's file. 
Noticeably absent is a sworn affidavit by defendant denying that 
he was served. See Carnes, 668 P.2d at 557 (holding defendant's 
affidavit denying that he was served with process was sufficient 
to preclude trial court's grant of summary judgment); Classic 
Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 an Hl3 (holding affidavit providing that 
company had no "record of receiving" service of process was not 
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut constable's 
Affidavit of Service); but see Casida v. Deland. 866 P.2d 599, 
602 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("While the judge 'should not 
arbitrarily reject competent, credible, uncontradicted testimony, 
nevertheless he [or she] is not compelled to believe evidence 
where there is anything about it which would reasonably justify 
refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the self-
interest of the witness.'") (citation omitted). To overcome his 
burden, defendant was required to provide competent evidence 
showing that service of process was not completed or was 
improper. See Skanchy, 952 P.2d at 1075 (holding defendants' 
argument regarding invalid service failed because defendants 
offered no supporting evidence); Reed, 806 P.2d at 1185 (stating 
it was defendant's burden to provide evidence that service was 
improper); cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge [and] shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . . " ) ; 
Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1126 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) ("It takes only one competent sworn statement to . . . 
create an issue of fact."). Because defendant has only generally 
argued through counsel, as opposed to providing sworn testimony, 
that he was never served, he has failed to meet his burden of 
proof that the 1982 judgment was entered without the requisite in 
personam jurisdiction.1 
Defendant argues next that "[t]he failure to give notice of 
the summary judgment motion deprived Richard A. Christensen of 
due process." However, defendant fails to develop this argument 
1. During his sworn deposition, when asked whether he knew if he 
was served in the earlier action, defendant candidly admitted, 
"No, I don't." 
981733-CA 3 
and merely reargues his position that the lack of any record 
evidence regarding service of process supports his contention 
that he was never served. Accordingly, we do not address this 
argument further. See Salt Lake City v. Wood, 19 99 UT App 3 23, 
f5, 991 P.2d 595 (opinion of Bench, J.) (stating this court will 
not address "cursorily presented issues" "unaccompanied by 
argument, analysis, or citation to any authority"). 
Lastly, defendant argues that the 1982 judgment should be 
vacated because his surname is misspelled on the caption of the 
pleadings. Defendant maintains that the misspelling by the one 
letter creates an ambiguity regarding who the judgment affects: 
Richard A. Christensen, or Richard A. Christenson. While we 
agree that "accuracy is always to be desired[,] . . . there 
should be no penalty or adverse effect for mere error which 
causes no harm." Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 545 
P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976). 
Defendant claims he is prejudiced in the amount of 
$1,850,000. However, his "prejudice" arises from the existence 
of the judgment, not from the misspelling of one letter in his 
last name. Defendant does not claim that because of the 
misspelling, he was not put on notice that the "Richard A. 
Christensen" in the caption referred to him. See Sulzen v. 
Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 1115, 977 P. 2d 497 (holding that 
amendment of caption in complaint was appropriate because, 
although defendants were incorrectly named, they "were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings"). 
Furthermore, if defendant was not: the same person named in 
the caption, except for the incorrect letter, he would be without 
the necessary standing to challenge the lack of service of 
process and the trial court's resulting lack of in personam 
jurisdiction. Cf^ _ Overturf v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 1999 
UT 3, 1)5, 973 P. 2d 413 (""Persons who are not parties of record 
to a suit have no standing therein which will enable them to take 
part in . . . the proceedings.'") (citation omitted; alteration 
in original). 
Finally, defendant fails to cite any authority for the 
proposition that a judgment must be vacated when a defendant's 
name is misspelled by one letter. Thus, defendant's failure to 
comply with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) provides an 
additional basis to reject his argument. 
In sum, because defendant has failed to meet his burden of 
showing that he was never served with process, and judgments are 
presumed to be entered with the requisite jurisdiction, we affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's Renewed Motion to Vacate 
Judgment. We also deny defendant's request to vacate the 1982 
Qfll 71^-CA 4 
judgment on the basis that his name was incorrectly spelled in 
the caption.2 
W^^ 
James' Z\ Davis ,/^udge 
/ 
WE CONCUR: 
lX-^2^±± 'CAM^fC* 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jacksg£f, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
2. Based on our disposition of the issues, we do not address 
interveners' arguments regarding the timeliness of defendant's 
motions and the prejudice to intervenors if the 1982 judgment is 
vacated. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 2000, a true and 
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in 
the United States mail to: 
DENVER C. SNUFFER JR. 
NELSON SNUFFER & DAHLE 
10885 S STATE ST 
SANDY UT 84070-4104 
BRUCE J. NELSON 
NELSON RASMUSSEN L CKRISTSNSEN 
215 S STATE STE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4111 
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v/as deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed 
below: 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
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APPEALS CASE NO. : 981733-CA 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A CHRISTENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
Case No: 960902187 PR 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Date: June 2, 2 000 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
careyss 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENVER C SNUFFER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRUCE J. NELSON 
Video 
Tape Number: 2000-29 Tape Count: 10:11-10:27 
The court grants the motion for summary judgment, and awards 
attorneys fees. Mr. Nelson is to prepare an affidavit and order 
for the court. 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. #3032 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSON 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
VS. 
UWE MICHEL and ULLRICH MICHEL 
as joint tenants; et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
) OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY 
) FEE APPLICATION 
) Civil No. 960902187 
) Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff objects to the application for attorney's fee for the following reasons: 
1. The Affidavit and supporting materials do not provide enough information to allow any 
analysis by the Plaintiff or the Court as to the reasonableness of the amounts claimed. The affidavit 
is. therefore, insufficient and should not be a basis for an award. The affidavit does not meet the 
requirements for admission of evidence, and has an insufficient foundation, lacking specificity and 
lacking supporting materials. 
2. The Affidavit makes it apparent that the charges include sums for attorneys fees for work 
done on cases other than the case before Judge Young. This includes the case before Judge 
Frederick as well and the Court of Appeals. There was never any intention by the Court to make an 
award of attorneys for those other legal proceedings in this case, nor would it be appropriate to do 
Third Judlcsal District 
JUL i - 2000 
so. 
3. Given the nature, complexity and overall case before Judge Young, the amount claimed 
of in excess of $38,000.00 is not reasonable. The total charges dramatically exceed the amounts 
incurred by Plaintiffs in this same proceeding. Accordingly, the amounts are excessive. The fee is 
not reasonable and should be reduced by the Court. 
4. The amount charged of $160.00 per hour is not reasonable and should be reduced by the 
Court. 
Further objections are not possible without supporting materials provided by Defendant's 
Counsel. 
\i DATED this l ^ day of July, 2000. 
Denver C. Jm-uffer, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING: 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle, P.C. and that I caused 
to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney for Uwe Michel & Ullrich Michel 
Nelson, Rasmussen & Christensen 
576 South State Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dated this J-. day of July, 2000. 
'# UC 
FILED DISTRICT COUBT 
Third Judicial District 
Bruce J. Nelson (2380) 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, P.C 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Attorneys for Defendants Michel 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE J. NELSON 
REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 960902187 
Judge David S. Young 
Bruce J. Nelson, after being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states: 
1. Affiant is attorney for Defendants Michel and has acted in such capacity throughout 
the course of this litigation. Plaintiff Richard A. Christenson's Complaint was filed in March of 
1996. Accordingly, Affiant has represented Defendants Michel in this matter for over four (4) years. 
2. In his capacity as counsel for Defendants Michel, Affiant has conducted multiple 
client conferences, interviewed and coordinated the actions of expert witnesses, filed Answers to the 
original Complaint and Amended Complaint, responded to multiple discovery requests, participated 
in numerous depositions, filed multiple Motions For Summary Judgment, attended multiple court 
hearings, conducted settlement negotiations, performed legal research, and in all events has 
1 
By 
JUL 19 2000 
LT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
attempted adequately defend the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
3. Affiant has practiced law in Salt Lake County for the past 23 years. Affiant charges 
the sum of $160.00 per hour for his legal services and has charged such rates for the past four (4) 
years. 
4. In this case, and to defend the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint and Amended 
Complaint, Affiant has expended 244.40 hours of attorney time. At the Affiant's regular hourly 
rates, such amount, through the date of this Affidavit, equal $38,773.50. Affiant has billed 
Defendants Michel for such amounts and the same have been paid. A month-to-month summary of 
Affiant's bills is attached as Exhibit UA". 
5. In addition to the attorney's fees, Affiant has incurred on behalf of Defendants 
Michel, substantial costs of Court. These costs of Court equal $3,557.75. A summary of Affiant's 
costs is attached as Exhibit "B". 
6. It is Affiant's opinion that the sum of $38,773.50 for attorney's fees and $3,557.75 
for costs incurred were all necessary and proper expenses in defending the allegations of Plaintiff s 
Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
7. It is the opinion of Affiant that such amounts are fair and reasonable under the 
circumstances and in considering the time expended, the complexity of the issues, and the results 
obtained. 
8. The foregoing fees are related to this case only. Additional fees have been expended 
in the related cases of (a) Zion's First National Bank v. Richard F. McKeen. et al. (handled by Judge 
2 
Frederick) and TWN v. Michel (pending in Provo). None of the time for such cases has been 
included in this Affidavit. 
DATED this (p day of Jt»3, 2000. 
/ / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this Lr day of July, 2000, personally appeared before me BRUCE J. NELSON, the 
signer of the foregoing AFFIDAVITOFBRUCE J NELSON REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
C H A P i r ^ H COLEMAN 
767 P <> nnse Pk Dr 
Sannv I T 84093 
MvC ^ ™^sion Expires 
np 16,2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July. 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDA VIT OF BR UCE J. NELSON REGARDING A TTORNEY'S FEES was mailed, postage pre-
paid to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq. 
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Bruce J. Nelson 
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FEE SCHEDULE 
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON 
Case No. 960902187 
EXHIBIT "A" 
1 BILL DATED 
1 01-31-97 
J 02-28-97* 
03-31-97 
1 04-30-97 
1 05-31-97 
1 06-30-97 
1 07-31-97 
1 08-31-97 
1 09-30-97 
1 10-31-97 
J 11-30-97 
1 12-31-97 
01-31-98 
02-28-98 
03-31-98 
04-30-98 
05-31-98 
06-30-98 
HOURS 
4.2 
3.0 
4.5 
.8 
1.5 
— 
.7 
— 
8.9 
10.4 
9.1 
4.4 
2.3 
4.8 
13.6 
53.4 
36.9 
12.4 
TOTAL $ AMOUNT 
$672.00 
$150.00 
$720.00 
$1,280.00 
$240.00 
$0.00 
$112.00 
$0.00 
$1,424.00 
$1,664.00 
$1,456.00 
$704.00 
$368.00 J 
$768.00 J 
$2,175.50 1 
$8,544.00 1 
$5,904.00 1 
$1,984.00 1 
1 
FEE SCHEDULE 
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON 
Case No. 960902187 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BILL DATED 
| 07-31-98 
1 08-31-98 
1 09-30-98 
1 10-31-98 
1 11-31-98 
| 12-31-98 
1 01-31-99 
1 02-28-99 
03-31-99 
04-30-99 
05-31-99 
(06-30-99 
07-31-99 
08-31-99 
J 09-30-99 
[10-31-99 
11-31-99 
12-31-99 
HOURS 
26.1 
21.0 
4.2 
3.3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
TOTAL $ AMOUNT | 
$4,176.00 J 
$3,360.00 1 
$672.00 
$528.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
2 
FEE SCHEDULE 
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON 
Case No. 960902187 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BILL DATED 
01-31-00 
02-29-00 
03-31-00 
04-30-00 
05-31-00 
06-30-00 
* Billed At $50.00/1 
HOURS 
— 
— 
5.0 
7.2 
3.7 
3.0 
24440 
tfr. 
TOTAL $ AMOUNT 
$0.00 
$0.00 | 
$800.00 
$1,152.00 
$592.00 
480.00 
TOTAL: I38J7150 
3 
COSTS SCHEDULE 
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON 
Case No. 960902187 
EXHIBIT "B" 
BILL DATED 
02-28-97 
03-31-97 
10-31-97 
04-30-98 
06-30-98 
07-31-98 
08-31-98 
DESCRIPTION 
Copies For Miscellaneous Corporate Filings 
Shaun Michel Deposition 
Richard Christenson Deposition 
Richard Christenson Deposition 
Mike Kirby Deposition 
Expert Witness Fees (Mike Kirby) 
Ralph Marsh Deposition Witness fees 
Tully, Webber and Jensen Depositions 
Ackerlow and Beck Depositions 
Walker and Hanks Depositions 
2nd Christenson Deposition 
Robinson Deposition 
Ralph Marsh Deposition 
Expert Witness Fee (Bush & Gudgell) 
TOTAL: 
TOTAL $ AMOUNT | 
$52.50 
$35.50 
$224.00 
$234.50 
$106.75 
$500.00 
$25.00 
$702.25 
$219.90 
$472.40 
$257.45 
$324.40 
$153.10 
$250.00 
$3.557.75 
1 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A CHRISTENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORDER 
Case No: 960902187 PR 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Date: August 2, 2 000 
Clerk: chriswc 
HEARING 
This matter comes now before the Court on Defendant's Notice to 
Submit regarding Defendant's Order for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiff's Objections to the Order, Defendant's Order Granting 
Attorney's Fees, and Plaintiff's Objections to Attorney's Fees. 
On June 2, 2000, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and awarded attorney's fees. Mr. Nelson prepared an 
affidavit and an Order for the Court consistent with the Court's 
findings. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file approves and signs 
Defendant's Order for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Order 
Granting Attorney's Fees. 
Dated this 5'- day of „(,< -•> <. - ><; i- 20 -
DAVID __ 
District Court Judge 
Case No: 960902187 
Date: Aug 02, 2 000 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 960902187 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BRUCE J. NELSON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
576 East South Temple 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SANDY, UT 840700000 
Dated this J)- day of C^y^,^ , 2o2f<2 . 
&rtt<r}&/ 
eputy Court Clerk 
FIIEB 
Bruce J. Nelson (2380) 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, P.C. 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 „ ^ -1 QTRY 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 ENTERED^N F«£-;£.' " T
 3y 
Attorneys for Defendants Michel ^ ' 
DATE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
swssasr 
°»PWyCfeifr 
IMAGE0 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MICHELS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 960902187 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendants Michels' Motion For Attorney's Fees came on for hearing before the above-
entitled court on Friday, June 2, 2000. Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., appeared as counsel for Defendants 
Michel, the moving parties. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq., was present and represented the interests 
of the Plaintiff Richard A. Christenson. The Court having considered the pleadings and documents 
on file herein, the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Defendants Michel are awarded a Judgment against the Plaintiff for attorney' s 
fees incurred in this matter, in the amount of $3 8,773.50. In addition, Defendants Michel are granted 
a Judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of $3,557.75 for costs of Court incurred herein. 
• Defendants Michels* Motio 
2. The total Judgment is, therefore, the sum of $42,331.25. Such Judgment shall bear 
interest at the legal rate from and after the date p£entry of Judgment. 
DATED this 4- day o£My, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
^•#^7^ 
DAVID S. YOUtyG 
District Court Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of July, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MICHELS' MOTIONFOR ATTORNEY'S FEESwas mailed, 
postage pre-paid to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq. 
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84Q70 
) S ^ 
Bruce J. Nelson 
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., #3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD CHRISTENSON, 
CERTIFICATE THAT NO 
Plaintiff, TRANSCRIPT IS NECESSARY 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL et al, Trial Civil No. 960902187 
Appellate No. 20000781 
Defendants. 
Judge David S. Young 
Pursuant to Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant, Richard 
Christenson, by and through his attorney of record, Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., hereby certifies to the 
Court that no transcript is needed in this action. 
DATED this \ ^ day of September, 2000. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
r C. Snufief, Denve f , Jr: 
"Attorney-fef "Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that am employed by Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, and that I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS NECESSARY, 
via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
on this(£-h day of September, 2000. 
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